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Résumé / Abstract
Cet article propose une analyse des périodes d’hyper-rendement des
marchés boursiers émergents, de 1976 à 1994 et porte sur 20 pays.  Une année dite
d’hyper-rendement survient lorsque, au cours de cette année, il est possible
d’observer une période durant laquelle le rendement cumulé de l’indice boursier
dépasse 70  %.  23 % des 279 années/pays étudiés correspondent à cette définition.
Un modèle logistique incorpore des indicateurs macroéconomiques contemporains,
des indicateurs du processus de libéralisation des marchés boursiers et les variations
du niveau de risque politique. Les périodes d’hyper-rendement sont associées de
façon significative aux variations de risque politique et aux épisodes de
libéralisation, mais les relations avec les changements de conditions économiques
sont faibles.  Un modèle prédictif est également testé, qui incorpore des mesures
agrégées des ratios cours/bénéfice et valeur comptable/valeur marchande en plus des
variations futures des conditions économiques.  Dans ce cas également, les
variations contemporaines de risque politique et les épisodes de libéralisation jouent
un rôle prédominant.
In this paper, we analyze hyper-return periods from 1976 to 1994 for
20 emerging stock markets.  We define a  hyper-return period as a calendar year
during which a cumulative geometric return in excess of 70% is observed.
According to this definition, the hyper-return periods represent 23% of the 279
country-year observations examined. First, a logistic model incorporating
contemporary macroeconomic variables, market liberalization steps and
political risk changes is used to explain hyper-return periods. Hyper-return
periods are shown to be associated with political risk changes and with
liberalization steps, whereas their relationship with changes in macroeconomic
conditions is shown to be weak. Second, when a predictive model where
aggregate price-to-earnings and book-to-market ratios and macroeconomic
variables are used in addition to changes in political risk and liberalization
steps, the latter variables play a predominant role.
 
Mots Clés : Marchés émergents, marchés boursiers, risque politique,
libéralisation
Keywords : Emerging Markets, Stock Markets, Political Risk, Liberalization
JEL : G1
 The Emerging Markets Data Base is provided by the International Finance Corporation,1
from the World Bank Group.  See The Emerging Stock Markets Fact Book for a description of the index
composition and computation.  The section entitled Currency Consideration of this publication provides
information relative to the conversion of local currency to the U.S. dollar.
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Introduction
In the last few years emerging markets have attracted many investors.  The reason
is that their stock markets generate considerable returns that have low correlations
with those of industrialized countries’ stock markets. This increases the benefits of
international diversification (Harvey, 1993).  However, these markets are also very
volatile (Divecha, Drach and Sefek,1992; Harvey, 1993) and a large part of their
performance seems to be driven by a few periods with excessively high returns.  For
instance (Table 1), annual geometric returns reached 602% in Venezuela (1990),
502% in Turkey (1989), 459% in Argentina (1976) and 383% in the Philippines
(1986).  The downside is that these high returns are often followed by large losses:
-75% in Mexico (1982), -66% in Brazil (1990), -63% in Zimbabwe (1981) and
-61% in Argentina (1989). These return outliers challenge both academics and
practitioners.  Can these hyper-returns be predicted by time-series models that
account for conditional volatility or for unexpected changes in economic and
structural factors? Are these returns induced by irrational factors? For practitioners,
the analysis of these periods is also important because the return on an emerging
market portfolio largely depends on the manager's ability to anticipate them.  This
paper analyzes hyper-return periods observed in a sample of emerging markets from
1976 to 1994.  It also provides an empirical validation of the Kim and Singal
(1993) and Hartmann and Khambata (1993) hypothesis, that links high stock
market returns to the liberalization and gradual opening of the market.
The paper is organized as follows.  In the first section we describe the data and
hypotheses.  We devote the second part of the paper to explaining hyper-return
periods, using a model that incorporates both liberalization and political risk
variables and macroeconomic determinants of stock market returns.  In the third
part of the paper, we investigate whether it is possible to predict hyper-return
periods, using aggregate stock market anomalies, naive macroeconomic forecasts
and liberalization variables.  The last section offers concluding comments.
1. Data and hypotheses
1.1 Return distribution analysis
We obtain monthly stock market returns, expressed in U.S. dollars, from the
Emerging Market Database
 (EMDB) .  Table 1 reports, for each of the 201
2countries under study, descriptive statistics about their annual returns. For 9
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Greece, India, Korea, Mexico, Thailand,
Zimbabwe), data are available for the 1976-1994 period (19 years). For 9 other
countries (Colombia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Portugal,
Taiwan, Turkey, Venezuela) data are only available for 8 to 10 years (1985-1994
subperiod or 1987-1994 subperiod).  Finally, data for Indonesia and Jordan are
available for 5 years and 16 years, respectively. To demonstrate the importance of
hyper-return periods (HRPs, hereafter), we compare mean annual geometric returns
obtained for each country from the complete series of available return observations
to those obtained after omitting the highest annual return from the series. This
criterion reduces considerably the average annual index returns.  For instance, the
average Turkish index return decreases from 20.8% to -4 %, while theVenezuelan
index return goes from 13.7% to -7.1%. To better assess the relative importance of
extreme annual returns, we also report maximum and minimum return values. In 15
out of 20 countries we observe at least one annual return greater than or equal to
95% (twice as much as the index). Losses can also be important, with half of the
countries (10 countries) displaying an annual drop of  50% or more. However, the
low frequency of dramatic negative return periods makes their study less interesting.
Table 1
Main characteristics of the distribution of annual returns of emerging stock markets, 1976-1994. 
Years Average Average annual geometric Maximum First Median Third Minimum
annual return quartile quartile
arithmetic
returns
Beg. Nb. Global The highest % Year % Year
annual return
is omitted
Argentina    76    19  731  261  161 4586 76 1682   98 -265 -611 89
Brazil    76    19  269  110   56 1704 91  698   3 -183 -657 90
Chile    76    19  479  343  296 1548 86  981  450  162 -546 82
Colombia    85    10  549  438  329 1913 91  786  361  122 -123 88
Greece    76    19  109   10  -40 1522 87  355  -2 -272 -534 83
India    76    19  197  174  139 1051 85  303  184   15 -156 87
Indonesia    90     5  108   3 -169 1134 93   29  -6 -193 -423 91
Jordan    79    16  109   91   67  522 81  245   16  -58 -122 84
Korea    76    19  241  180  142 1128 88  392  205  -44 -380 80
Malaysia    85    10  181  137   66 1029 93  279  120 -112 -215 94
Mexico    76    19  331  180  143 1083 88  972  254  -48 -750 82
Nigeria    85    10  186   52  -61 1909 94  378   60 -132 -567 86
Pakistan    85    10  278  206  102 1721 91  207  124   64 -184 92
Philippines    85    10  737  473  291 3826 86  595  494  183 -539 90
Portugal    87     8  308  152  -6 2241 87  391  109 -239 -298 90
Taiwan    85    10  407  278  203 1208 87  933  359  -6 -509 90
Thailand    76    19  292  221  177 1382 77  407  217  -68 -322 79
Turkey    87     8 1000  208  -40 5024 89 2482 -215 -473 -611 88
Venezuela    85    10  597  137  -71 6016 90  526 -155 -266 -423 92
Zimbabwe    76    19  262   81   31 1538 85  947  184 -195 -630 81
 This admittedly arbitrary definition has been used by Frankel and Rose (1996) in their2
study of currency crashes in emerging markets.  As these limits are imposed arbitrarily, a sensitivity
analysis is conducted to test the robustness of results to this definition of HRPs.
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1.2 Defining and detecting hyper-return periods
We define HRPs as periods with returns of 70% or more.  The HRPs could have
been detected  by looking at the geometric annual returns in a year.  However, the
planning horizon of portfolio managers do not necessarily correspond with a
calendar year or any particular 12-month period. Therefore, a two-step procedure
was used whereby HRPs were first identified and then assigned to calendar years
as follows.
First, geometric returns were computed over a 6-month moving window over the
entire sample and period available. Windows with geometric returns greater than
or equal to 70% were identified. If such returns occur once or more during a
calendar year, the given year is said to be a hyper-return period. If such returns
occur during the first three months of a calendar year, the HRP is assigned to the
previous calendar year.    Using this method, 24% of the 279 country-year2
observations in the sample were identified as HRPs.  Table 2 reports these HRPs
by country and by year. Relatively few of these HRPs occur in the 1976-1984
subperiod (except for Argentina and Chile), most appearing in the 1985-1994
subperiod.  The year with the most HRPs (8) is 1987 and the country with the
greatest number of HRPs (8) is Argentina.
Table 2
Positive hyper-return periods for the emerging stock markets, from 1976 to 1994.
Six-month geometric index returns are reported as percentages.
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Argentina  1117     135  317                87      360  123  248    212    
Brazil    83  202  115  157      158  113    70
Chile   145  201    97  103  109    74    85         
Colombia  162  249    92
Greece    93  110  207      
India    92        72   104
Indonesia
Jordan
Korea    98  105
Malaysia    73     
Mexico  116    75    95  177    88    73      77
Nigeria 142
Pakistan  128
Philippines  155  104  105
Portugal    92  329
Taiwan  212  139    96
Thailand        96                    83    91     
Turkey  344  258  308  124    84
Venezuela    72     260
Zimbabwe    79          189  132  112
 See Cosset and Suret (1995) for a review of previous studies on political risk.3
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1.3 Hypotheses
A survey of the financial literature revealed relatively few studies that deal
specifically with HRPs. However, it is generally accepted that liberalization periods
are associated with high returns on market indices.  Gooptu (1993) notes that
“recent regulatory changes in the developing countries are creating an appropriate
environment for attracting foreign portfolio investment flows” (p. 60). As indicated
by Hartmann and Khambata (1993, p. 92), such capital flows can lead to an
increase in stock prices.   Demingûç-Kunt and Huizinga (1994) note that
restrictions to foreign investment represent effective barriers to portfolio flows and
significantly increase pretax equity returns. Hartmann and Khambata (1993) as well
as Kim and Singal (1993) estimate that liberalization steps increase the demand for
emerging market equities from foreign investors, thus pushing up market returns.
However, legal and fiscal restrictions are but two of a variety of barriers to foreign
investment.  Political risk is also an important factor in international portfolio
decisions .  Political risk is a multidimensional concept which includes some3
aspects similar to those previously evoked concerning liberalization.  For example,
Solnik (1991) states that political transfer risk can take the form of a prohibition on
repatriation of profits and/or capital investment from a foreign country.  However,
Robock (1971) suggests a broader definition of political risk, including unexpected
discontinuities in the business environment resulting from political changes.
Errunza (1983) and French and Poterba (1991), among others, acknowledge that
political risk influences the international portfolio investment decision.  Thus a
reduction in political risk might also be associated with a rapid increase in stock
prices.  On the basis of these studies, the central null hypothesis of this paper can
be stated as follows: There is no relationship between HRPs and either decreases
in political risk or the liberalization process.
To specify the model correctly, it is necessary to take into account other variables
likely to influence market index returns. Previous studies (Chen, Roll and Ross,
1986; Bodurtha, Cho and Senbet, 1989; Ferson and Harvey, 1993) have identified
three main (macroeconomic) factors that can be linked to stock prices: economic
activity, unexpected inflation and interest rates.  Given the difficulty of obtaining
reliable and consistent data on interest rates in emerging markets, we take only the
first two variables into account.  In addition, recent studies (Easton, Harris and
Ohlson, 1992) have brought to light a close relationship between firms’ market and
accounting returns.  In consequence, among the control variables, we include the
variation of the accounting rate of return on equity for all stocks included in the IFC
index (also provided by the EMDB). Thus, the explicative model includes
 PRS, formerly Frost & Sullivan and developed by Michel O'Leary and William Coplin,4
is one of the world's leading agencies providing assessments of political risk.  PRS's monthly newsletter,
Political Risk Letter, publishes monthly forecasts of political risk in 85 countries.  These forecasts rely
on independent judgments from over 250 country experts in the United States and overseas.   See Cosset
and Suret (1995) for a more complete description of the data.  For the two first years covered by the
study, no political risk ratings were available.  The first available ratings (1978) are thus considered to
apply to previous years, i.e. we assume no variation in political risk grades for the years 1976 and 1977.
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macroeconomic indicators, the accounting rate of return and the political risk and
liberalization variables discussed above.
Our model to predict HRPs is based on previous empirical studies that associate
security returns to market anomalies (Fama and French, 1992). These studies were
generally conducted at the security level.  The three generally accepted market
anomalies are size, price-to-earnings ratio (PE) and price-to-book ratio (PB). The
first anomaly is not relevant when using aggregated data (emerging stock market
indices), but we retain the aggregate PE and PB ratios. Consequently, three groups
of variables were used to determine to what extent it is possible to anticipate HRPs.
The first set of variables are the variations in political risk and liberalization steps
during the contemporary period. Implicitly we are assuming that these variations
can be partially anticipated. The second group of variables is made up of three
indicators (variation of inflation, of Gross Domestic Product and of return on equity)
during the preceding year. Finally, assuming that an analogy between market
anomalies at the stock level and market anomalies at the market level is possible,
the third group of variables includes aggregate price-to-earnings (PE) and price-to-
book (PB) ratios. 
1.4 Measurement problems 
Political risk:   Monthly political risk indices relative to direct investment, as
provided by Political Risk Services (PRS), are used as measures of perceived
political risk .  A grade "A" for a country means low political risk exposure.4
According to Cosset and Suret (1995), international portfolio investors' political
risk is associated with the uncertainty of future capital controls and therefore with
PRS' risk category that applies to financial transfers.  Specifically, this category
refers to risk of financial transfers, local currency non-convertibility, and transfer
of foreign currency out of the country (the transfer could be for payment of exports,
repatriation of profits or capital, or for any other business purpose).  Political risk
indices are first transformed to numerical values (see appendix 1). The relative
annual variation of the political risk level observed from December to December
is then calculated as  )PR  = ((PR  - PR ) / PR ).t t t-1 t-1
8Liberalization: Taking into account steps leading to market liberalization is difficult
since there is no systematic account of these events and liberalization is often a
gradual process which can not easily be attributed to a specific date (Kim and
Singal, 1993).  A systematic survey of events linked to the liberalization of
emerging markets was thus carried out. This account is similar to that of Kim and
Singal, but spans a broader group of announcements.  Indeed, included in this list
are all events of an economic nature likely to affect markets in a positive way:
liberalization measures, debt refinancing agreements, massive privatization
initiatives, measures to ease and stimulate investments by foreigners, etc.  A binary
variable (LIB) takes the value 1 for a given country-year when a liberalization step
is deemed to have taken place in that country during that year.  When the announced
measures bear on many consecutive years, each of these years is attributed the value
1.  A list of liberalization steps and periods over which these events are expected
to have an influence is presented in appendix 2.
Control variables were obtained as follows.  The Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
in US $, was extracted from the Emerging Stock Markets Fact Book  (various
years, published by the International Finance Corporation, IFC), for the years 1980-
1994.  For 1976 to 1979 inclusively, data were taken from the United Nations
Statistical Yearbook.  Since data for corresponding years in both sources was not
exactly identical, the data taken from the United Nations source were adjusted using
the ratio of the 1980 GDP values taken from both sources.  )GDP , the annualt 
variation of the GDP, is given by ((GDP  - GDP ) / GDP ). The rate of inflation,t t-1 t-1
INFL  , was also taken from the Emerging Stock Markets Fact Book for the years
 t
1981-1994.  From 1976 to 1980 inclusively, it was taken from the International
Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund. The annual change in the
inflation rate, )INFL, is given by  ((INFL - INFL ) / INFL ).t t-1 t-1
The price-to-earnings (PE ) and the price-to-book value (PB ) ratios are extractedt t
from the  Emerging Stock Markets Fact book.   The earnings-to-book value ratio
is given by (PB  / PE )=EB . The annual variation of the earnings-to-book valuet t t
ratio, )EB , is calculated as follows: (EB  - EB ) / EB .t t t-1 t-1
2. Methodology and results
2.1 Models
Logistic models are used to estimate the coefficients associated with a set of
independent variables likely to explain or predict the HRP dummy variable.  The
general logistic model can be stated as follows:
Li ' ln
Pi
(1&Pi)
' $1%$2Xi,2%...%$k Xi,k
Ln
Pi
(1&Pi,t)
' $1%$2)INFLi,t%$3)GDPi,t%$4)ROEi,t%$5)PRi,t%$6
Li,t ' $1%$2)INFLi,t%$3)GDPi,t%$4)ROEi,t%$5)PRi,t%$6 LIBi,t
%$7)INFLi,t%1%$8)GDPi,t%1%$9)ROEi,t%1
Li ' $1%$2)INFLi,t&1%$3)GDPi,t&1%$4)ROEi,t&1%$5PEi,t&1%$6 PBi,t&1
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
where P  is the probability of observing a HRP during the year t for a specifici 
country and X  to X  are the independent variables.  Four models are estimated.2 k
Models 1 and 2 are descriptive, testing the relationship between HRPs and
concurrent variables, whereas Models 3 and 4 use previous years' data to predict
future HRPs.
The following is the default model (Model 1):
where )INFL, )GDP and )ROE stand for the annual relative change in the
inflation rate, in the Gross Domestic Product and in the rate of return on equity of
listed companies, respectively.  )PR is the annual change in political risk and LIB
is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when a liberalization step occurs and 0
otherwise.
Model 2 allows for a possible expectation effect.  It is possible that investors
forecast the evolution, over the following year, of indicators associated with market
returns.  Thus, variations in inflation, GDP and ROE for the year following the year
of analysis are added to model 1 and used as control variables. Model 2 can be
stated as follows:
Model 3 is a simple predictive model which can be used by a portfolio manager
investing in emerging markets:
However, this predictive model does not factor in changes in political risk and the
ongoing liberalization process.  Model 4 takes these variables into account:
Li ' $1%$2)INFLi,t&1%$3)GDPi,t&1%$4)ROEi,t&1
%$5)PRi,t%$6LIBi,t%$7 PEi,t&1%$8PBi,t&1
 A pair of input observations with different responses (L , L) is said to be concordant5 i j
(discordant) if the larger response has a lower (higher) predicted event probability (e /1-e ) than thex x
smaller response. If the pair is neither concordant nor discordant, it is a tie.
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(5)
In this model, the variations in inflation, GDP and ROE are calculated for the
preceding year while the average PE and PB ratios are estimated at the end of the
year preceding the HRP. Variations in political risk are considered to be predictable
and they are measured simultaneously with the HRP.
2.2 Results
Results of the various models are reported in Table 3, where HRPs are defined
according to the 70% limit.  
Explanatory models
Models 1 and 2 show that variations in political risk as well as liberalization steps
are highly significant.  In Model 1, as expected, variations in political risk are
negatively linked to the probability of observing a HRP (p-value of 0.0241), since
a decrease (increase) in this risk is considered as positive (negative) for investors.
On the other hand, liberalization steps are positively associated with HRPs (p-value
of 0.0001) for they favour the inflow of foreign capital. The values of the
coefficients associated with both variables, as well as their significance levels, vary
slightly when changes in control variables are introduced in the model (Model 2).
The explanatory power of variations in inflation, GDP and firms’ rates of return is
weak.  Indeed, none of the coefficients corresponding to these variables is
significant at the 5% level. HRPs are thus linked more to variations in regulatory or
political conditions than to contemporary variations in the economy (Model 1).
However, the introduction of variations in inflation and GDP during the following
period improves the model (Model 2).  Both coefficients are significant at the 5%
level. Thus, HPRs seem to occur not only during periods of liberalization or
decrease in political risk, but also when agents expect an improvement in the
country's economic performance. To test the ability of the models to correctly
classify HRPs and non-HRPs, the percentage of concordant/discordant pairs has
been computed .  Models 1 and 2 discriminate HRPs and non-HRPs at 75% and5
79% levels, respectively.
Predictive models
Models 3 and 4 attempt to predict HRPs. In Model 3, all variables are measured
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before the HRP.  Only the BM variable (book-to-market ratio) plays a significant
role and predicts, to a certain extent,  HRPs. It is negatively related to HRPs and has
a p-value of 0.0038. This result is identical to that observed by Fama and French
(1992) at the security level. In Model 4, the inclusion of variables linked to
liberalization steps and to variations in political risk contemporary to HRPs
appreciably improves the model, whose chi-square increases from 16.6% to
27.95%. Their inclusion, however, changes the sign of the BM coefficient. The
ability of both models to correctly classify HRPs and non-HRPs is reduced
compared to Models 1 and 2.  However, the percentages of concordant/discordant
pairs are still 67.5 % (Model 3) and 78,7% (Model 4).
Sensitivity analysis
In order to test the robustness of the previous results, the four models were re-
estimated redefining HRPs as periods with 50% and 90% six-month geometric
returns.  When the definition is relaxed (50% level), the only notable difference is
the fact that political risk variation no longer plays a significant role in the
explanatory models (Models 1 and 2).  Liberalization steps still play an important
role.  The relaxed definition of HRPs also weakens the performance of predictive
models.  On the other hand, when the definition of HRPs is made more restrictive
(geometric returns of 90%), the validity of the models is reinforced, both overall and
in terms of the variables’ significance levels.  With that exception, results are
identical to those reported in Table 3.
3. Concluding remarks
Extreme returns obtained on emerging stock markets and their low correlation with
developed markets’ returns have attracted many investors.  However, their volatility
has also discouraged many of them. We examined whether hyper-return periods
observed in emerging stock markets are associated with three different sets of
fundamental variables: 1) the liberalization process and changes in political risk; 2)
macroeconomic indicators (variations in inflation, in Gross Domestic Product and
in aggregate returns on equity); and 3) market anomalies transposed to the market
level (price-to-earnings ratio and price-to-book ratio).  
We find evidence that financial liberalization and changes in political risk are the
variables that have the strongest impact on stock market returns and the existence
of hyper-return periods. The positive effect of liberalization on emerging stock
markets is consistent with an increase in foreign investment. This result is of
particular interest because the implementation of liberalization processes in
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emerging markets could alternatively have induced capital outflows (Kim and
Singal, 1993) or complicated  macroeconomic adjustment policies to capital flows
(Corbo and Hernandez, 1993).
Macroeconomic indicators play a role in explaining hyper-return periods only if
investors are able to correctly predict the future inflation rates or Gross Domestic
Products.  However, return on equity does not help to identify hyper-return periods.
Finally, aggregate market anomalies are not good predictors of hyper-return periods.
While the price-to-book ratio is significant and of the expected sign when used
alone, it provides no incremental explanatory power when the political risk and
liberalization variables are included in the model.
Thus, liberalization and political risk dominate other variables in identifying hyper-
return periods in 20 emerging stock markets over the 1976-1994 period.  However,
macroeconomic variables as well as return on equity, price-to-earnings and price-
to-book ratios are not free from measurement problems. The three latter variables
are computed from detailed data about individual stocks from emerging stock
markets. The reliability of these data is sometimes questionable.  In addition,
emerging stock market returns are driven by very few firms and the huge returns
observed on emerging markets may be due to the strategic and comparative
advantages of these firms on the international markets. The success factors of these
firms are not considered in the paper. Finally, the paper focuses upon fundamental
factors likely to explain hyper-return periods in emerging stock markets.  However,
these returns can be greatly affected by the considerable capital flows which are
governed more by speculative and short-term interests than by investment decisions
based on fundamentals. 
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Table 3
Results from the 4 logistic models used to estimate the coefficients of
independent variables assumed to explain HRPs. P-values appear under
the coefficients.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
INTCPT 2.0039 2.4503 2.017     -2.4968
0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0002*     0.0001*
)INFL 232502107 +0.1084
0.5893
)GDP 1705601584 +0.9322
0.479
)ROE 210604112 +0.0087
0.9796
)PR -1.7037 -1.5526 -26697
0.0241* 0.0365* 0.0288*
LIB +1.4717 +1.4644 +1.2780
0.0001* 0.0004* 0.0140*
BM -1.0786 +0.9519t-1
 0.0038* 0.0149*
PE -6308033 +0.0151t-1
0.6127
)INFL -0.0308 -217303819t-1
 0.7275
)GDP 1023404900 -2545301464t-1
)ROE 409801848 -354803330t-1
)INFL +0.4841t+1
0.0301*
)GDP +3.8821t+1
0.0126*
)ROE +0.0465t+1
8681
Chi Square 31401 36298 16990 27950
p. value 1 1 53 2
Association of predicted probabilities and observed responses
Concordant 75.3% 79.0% 67.5% 78.5%
Discordant 24.3% 20.8% 31.6% 20.9%
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Appendix 1
Political risk levels
The Political Risk Services quotations are transformed to numerical values for
simplified use (refer to the Cosset and Suret study for the transformation in
numerical values).  In addition, the following table shows the reconciliation of
political risk quotations from Frost & Sullivan and Political Risk Services.
Political Risk Service Frost & Sullivan Quotation values used
(1982 to 1984) (1978 70 1981)
A+ < 13% 0.125
A 13% - 15% 0.380
A- 15% - 17% 0.630
B+ 17% - 20% 0.880
B 20% - 23% 1.130
B- 23% - 25% 1.380
C+ 25% - 27% 1.630
C 27% - 30% 1.880
C- 30% - 33% 2.130
D+ 33% - 35% 2.380
D 35% - 37% 2.630
D- 37% - 40% 2.880
Appendix 2
Steps of liberalization in emerging markets
Liberalization steps Year of event
Argentina
A new team of Argentine policymakers set out to dismantle government controls in prices, interest, 1976
international trade and capital flows.
Full liberalization of the banking system (EUI, 1986):  elimination of highly centralized banking arrangements 1977
to give incentives to domestic financial intermediation.
From 1976 until 1978, the financial market was characterized by many financial reforms, including interest 1978
rate liberalization in 1978 (Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod, 1992).
Massive privatization initiative. 1988
Almost complete elimination of controls on prices, salaries, and foreign exchange transactions. 1989
The tax on exports was eliminated.  A major deregulation decree was issued. This ended a series of market- 1991
impeding rules and dissolved several regulatory bodies.
October’s massive deregulation programme included the following provisions: the abolition of the 36 % capital 1992
gains tax on foreign investors, the elimination of fixed brokerage commissions and the introduction of foreign
competition in the brokerage industry.
Brazil
The Brazilian government began new efforts to stimulate interest in the market by creating the Securities 1976
Commission (mandate: to regulate the market and encourage its role in development).  Other measures
included an attempt to attract foreign investors through special investment companies.
Interest rate were liberalized in November and a more relaxed price control policy was announced. 1980
New legislation (Resolution No 1224) which enables foreign investment in the domestic capital markets 1985
through two new mechanisms: “foreign capital investment funds” and “managed portfolios of bonds and
securities”.
The Central Bank issued resolution No 1460, amending the previous regulations on debt/equity swaps. 1988
Accordingly, funds originating from conversions can be invested in the Brazilian securities market through
foreign capital conversion funds.
Access of foreign investors to capital markets was liberalized. 1989
Foreign investment in Brazilian equities became more favorable after the passage of Resolutions 1848 and 1990
1832.  1848: allows for the issuance of ADRs and IDRs through primary and secondary offerings.  Foreigners
are exempt from withholding tax on capital gains but dividends are subject to a 15 % tax at the time of
remittance.  1938: takes away the diversification requirements of the past, abolishes the minimum time period
of investment of capital (90 days), allows complete freedom for institutional investors although limiting them
to a minority ownership in the company, allows foreign institutional investors to invest in the Brazilian market
through a managed portfolio.  The CVM plans to continue to liberalize rules for foreign investment.
Brazil’s SEC announced new rules allowing foreign institutions to purchase shares listed on Brazilian 1991
exchanges directly.
A special tax on profit and dividend remittances abroad was eliminated and foreign investors were authorized 1992
to operate in future and option markets on interest rates and securities (Banco Pactual, 1994)
Chile
Allocative quotas and interest rate ceilings were abolished in 1976.  Restrictions to capital flows were 1976
eliminated in 1976 (Faruqi, 1993).
Deregulation of the country’s financial system (Sundararajan and Balino, 1991). 1977
In 1979, international capital flows were freed and commercial banks were authorized to accept foreign 1979
deposits (Haggard, Lee, Maxfield, 1993).
Establishment of a Securities Commission. 1980
A law was enacted which provides the legal framework within which foreign investment funds may invest new 1987
money in the securities market.
In 1990, capital flows were liberalized. 1990
Colombia
In 1985, authorities allowed foreign interests to take more than a 49% stake in banks which were threatened 1985
with collapse.
Forced investments were gradually eliminated and interest rates were freed.  New financial intermediaries were 1989
authorized, fusions and transformations of existing ones were facilitated.  Foreign investment in the financial
sector which had been restricted since 1975 was opened.  Two markets were established: a free one for trade
in some services and a controlled one for the rest.  Steps were taken to adopt a reform of the financial sector,
to increase competition and to allocate resources more responsively to market forces.  Most interest rates were
freed rapidly.  New financial intermediaries were authorized (Faruqi, 1993).
Capital gains tax and wealth tax were eliminated. 1990
Foreign investment regulations were liberalized: Direct foreign investors may take ownership up to 100 %, 1991
capital must remain within the company for a minimum of a year, although profits and dividends may be freely
repatriated.  Exception: if enterprise is within the terms of the Cartagena Agreement, ownership must become
51 % Colombian; direct foreign investment in banks, insurance and other financial institutions cannot exceed
49 %; investment in securities must be authorized by the National Planning Department (NPD).
In mid-March, the government announced a further liberalization of the regulations governing foreign 1992
investments in the local stock market (EIU, 1992).
Greece
Greek foreign exchange regulations now permit free remittance by residents of EEC countries of dividends and 1986
the sale proceeds of quoted shares.
Liberalization of currency controls allowed foreigners to participate in the Greek market and to repatriate their 1987
capital and gains.
India
Measures were taken to liberalize trade, and fiscal incentives and flexible exchange rate management 1981
improved export incentives. 
Economic liberalization set in motion by the Rajiv Ghandi Government. 1985
The establishment of the India International Fund enabled foreigners to trade indirectly on the country's 1986
stock exchanges. 
The new government launched a far-reaching programme of economic liberalization and reform, including 1991
a considerable liberalization of foreign investment.
Financial sector reforms began, which include eliminating government control over firm borrowings in 1992
domestic capital markets. Markets were liberalized up to 24% of the issued share capital (Kim and Singal,
1993).
Indonesia
The Government planned to reduce external debt by raising tax revenues and continuing to encourage a 1990
high rate of foreign investment.  The Minister of Finance issued new regulations governing the licensing of
capital market supporting institutions. 
Jordan
Nil
Korea
The government allowed non-residents to begin indirect investment in equities. 1981
For the first time, foreign investors were allowed to hold equity directly in Korean companies that sell 1985
convertible bonds overseas. 
The capital  market was being opened, as foreign investment was allowed up to 10% of the capital of listed 1992
companies (Kim and Singal, 1993).
Malaysia
The market was opened as far as 30% for banks and institutions, and 100% for the other stocks (Kim and 1988
Singal, 1993).
Mexico
Financial sector was liberalized, measures included easier entry by domestic and foreign capital. 1987
The financial sector was liberalized in 1988 (Faruqi, 1993). 1988
Regulations of foreign investment were modified to encourage investment by introducing automaticity and 1989
transparency and harmonizing the tax system.  In some sectors, 100 % foreign ownership is allowed, 49 % and
30 % for brokerage houses and banks, respectively.  Foreigners are now allowed to purchase securities in the
Mexican stock market.
Price controls were relaxed. 1990
Nigeria
New measures to liberalize legislation regulating foreign investment, a privatization initiative and a system for 1988
providing a united exchange rate for the naira, determined by the market.
Foreign investors are now allowed 100 % ownership of companies in a wide range of economic activities 1989
(Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree was enacted).
Pakistan
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto launched privatization plans.  A new stock exchange opened in Islamabad. 1989
The Government removed the majority of foreign-exchange controls (Kim and Singal , 1993). 1991
Philippines
The market is investable by foreigners up to 40% (Kim and Singal, 1993). 1989
President Ramos ended controls on the transfer of foreign currency in the Philippines, to attract overseas 1992
capital.
Portugal
The introduction of new regulatory directives are expected to improve both primary and secondary markets and 1987
improve liquidity.  In addition, computerized paperless trading and liberalized investment funds are introduced.
Voluntary liberalization implemented: gradual deregulation of money and foreign currency markets and 1989
liberalized interest rates.
Taiwan
Foreign exchange controls were liberalized considerably. 1987
Various financial reforms were passed, including plans to allow private banks to set up business. 1989
The government permitted foreign institutional investors to invest directly in listed securities. The market is 1991
considered investable up to 10% (Kim and Singal, 1993).
Thailand
Relaxation, in 1989, of foreign exchange dealings, switching the business from the central bank to 1989
commercial banks (Janssen, 1994).
Monetary arrangements have been liberalized; deposit interest rates (except savings deposit rate) have 1990
been completely freed; the foreign exchange regime and controls have also been further relaxed.
In 1992, commercial banks were permitted to undertake investment banking businesses.  Adoption of the 1992
SEC act, which empowers limited companies to issue debt instruments directly to the public and to
encourage the issuance of new financial instruments (Bowman, 03-93)
In March, Thailand opened the door a crack to foreign competition (Warber, 03-94).  Since early 1993, the 1993
ministry of finance has eased control on some finance and securities companies (Davies, 03-94).
Turkey
Since 1986, stock dividends have become exempt from tax to both domestic and foreign shareholders.  Capital 1986
gains tax rates for foreign investors have been reduced so that the same rates and regulations apply as for
domestic holders.  The Istanbul Stock Exchange was reopened.
New procedures for the setting up of investment trusts and for the repatriation of funds, allowing institutions, 1988
but not individuals, to invest through a local intermediary.
Since 1989, foreigners have been allowed to trade in listed securities with no restrictions whatsoever, and pay 1989
no withholding or capital gains taxes provided they are registered with the Capital Markets Board and the
Treasury.  Foreigners are allowed to purchase stocks and bonds freely, with guaranteed repatriation of the
proceeds, following a decree aiming at lira convertibility.  Capital markets reform bill provides further
liberalization.
Venezuela
Government announces a programme of economic measures, including foreign investment incentives. 1986
Maracaibo Stock Exchange is established.  The MSC has minimized procedures for new offers of securities.
Interest rates liberalized in 1989 (Sundararajan, 1995).  Liberalization of controls on interest rates and prices 1989
(Evans, 1989)
Removal of most restrictions and implementation of a privatization programme.  The amendment of the income 1990
tax law completely eliminated withholding taxes on dividend remittence abroad: all dividends paid to foreign
shareholders are now exempt from Venezuelan income tax.  Capital gains from the sale of all types of shares
are now subject to ordinary tax rates.  In 1990, Venezuela radically liberalized foreign investment policies.
In January, the government allowed the purchase and issuance of debt and equity securities by foreigners, and
unrestricted access to domestic credit and capital markets. 
Zimbabwe
Relaxation of existing financial constraints concerning foreign ownership of companies and remittence of after- 1989
tax profits.
The main sources used were the World Bank publications, Euromoney, The Financial Times, The Economist, the IMF, the
OECD, Political Risk Services, Business International as well as various articles published in The Quarterly Review of
Economics and Finance and Finance Development. This summary was done by  É. Chavez and V. Girard, whom we wish to
thank, as well as Klaus Fischer, who kindly gave us access to complementary data.
Other sources used: Banco Pactual, The Economy, Euromoney, 1994, p. 1-3; Bowman, L., Doctor’s orders for Thai banks,
Euromoney, March 1993, p. 80-82.
Davies, B., A gradual revolution, AsiaMoney, Vol. 5, March 1994, p. 32-34.;EUI:  The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country
Profiles (various countries), Annual Survey of political and economic background; Evans, R., Two Bankers Top the Bill, The
Banker, March 1989, p. 79-82.
Faruqi, S., Financial Sector Reforms in Asian and Latin American Countries: Lessons of Comparative Experience, The
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Financial Restructuring of Banks during Transition to Indirect Instruments of Monetary Control, International Monetary Fund
Working Paper, August 1995.
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